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Commentary/Stanovich & West: Individual differences in reasoning
A mental model to capture this reasoning can be expressed as a
“rationale” (McCain 1992):
R:
(I) I want the highest payoff,
(II) Choosing “cooperate” gives both me and my counterpart the
highest payoff,
(IIa) and my counterpart, knowing that, will choose “cooperate”; so
that (IIb) my own maximum payoff comes from a choice of
“cooperate.”
(III) Choose “cooperate.”

A player with a rich repertoire of game-theoretic mental models will recognize that (IIb) does not apply to game B, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and will apply a different rationale to it.
However, a player with a less rich set of mental models for game
theory may fail to make the distinction between the two games and
apply to both the simplified rationale:
R*:
(I) I want the highest payoff,
(II) Choosing “cooperate” gives both me and my counterpart the
highest payoff, so that is the best choice.
(III) Choose “cooperate.”

This oversimple mental model still leads to the best (normatively rational) outcome in the coordination game, but it leads to
frequent choices of “cooperate” in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
If the player is lucky enough to be matched with another player
who makes the same mistake, they will both be better off than they
would if they were rational, which is the fact that gives the Prisoner’s Dilemma its fascination. As a result, these mistakes may be
mistaken for altruistic behavior or for a higher rationality. But the
point for our purpose is that they are predictable: we expect a
much greater frequency of “mistakes” on the Prisoner’s Dilemma
than on the coordination game.
In general, failure to make appropriate distinctions in the mental model will lead to inappropriate contextualization, one of the
characteristics of “System 1.” This will be correlated with a smaller
and less expert set of mental models for game interactions, which
is likely to be correlated with many other things.
In conclusion, it seems correct that examination of individual
differences will support a Meliorist as against a Panglossian or
Apologist position on rationality. However, these observations are
consistent with a pluralist view that sees non-normative responses
as arising from idiosyncratic subjective knowledge structures.
Such a view should not be lumped with performance errors since
it is not at all clear that errors stemming from idiosyncratic knowledge structures will be random. Instead, we should investigate
what range of predictable errors might arise from idiosyncratic
knowledge structures. In doing so, we may draw on a wide range
of evidence, including experimental game theory.
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Abstract: Tasks in the adult reasoning literature are designed so that
heuristic processing leads one astray and adequate rule-based processing
requires explicit knowledge about applicable logical and quasi-logical
norms. Other research, however, indicates that appropriate rule-based inferences can be automatic. Individual differences in rationality are largely
due to differences in developmental progress toward metacognitive understanding of both heuristic and rule-based inferences.

Theorists of human reasoning have typically assumed that there
exists a prototypical way people think and that the goal of psychological research on reasoning is to determine what that way is. Although evidence for diversity in reasoning has long been abundant, it has typically been dismissed as artifactual or theoretically
uninteresting. In an important and convincing challenge to the
standard view, Stanovich & West (S&W) have demonstrated that,
on the contrary, diversity in reasoning is genuine, substantial, systematic, and theoretically important. In this commentary, I elaborate on the nature and locus of diversity in reasoning.
Central to S&W’s analysis is a distinction between automatic
heuristic processing (characteristic of what they call System 1) and
explicit rule-based processing (characteristic of what they call System 2). I believe this dichotomy confounds two orthogonal distinctions. Specifically, the distinction between automatic and explicit processing is conceptually orthogonal to the distinction
between heuristic and rule-based processing. Crossing automatic
versus explicit with heuristic versus rule-based suggests four possible types of processing: (a) automatic heuristic processing (System 1), (b) automatic rule-based processing (not represented in
the Stanovich/West analysis), (c) explicit heuristic processing
(also not represented), and (d) explicit rule-based processing (System 2).
Why do S&W collapse the two distinctions into one, and thus
end up with two categories rather than four? I think it is because
they focus on the literature on adult reasoning. On the tasks presented to subjects in this literature, heuristic processing tends to
be automatic, whereas rule-based processing requires explicit
awareness and control of one’s inferences.
Research on elementary logical and mathematical inferences,
however, shows that people of all ages, including preschool children, routinely make automatic inferences that are fully in accord
with rules of deductive logic, probability theory, and so on (Braine
& O’Brien 1998; Hawkins et al. 1984; Huber & Huber 1987;
Scholnick & Wing 1995). Without a steady stream of unconscious
rule-based inferences, in fact, ordinary activities such as reading
and conversation would be impossible.
Correspondingly, research and theory on metacognition suggest that explicit reasoning often involves the deliberate application of heuristic principles (for reviews, see Kuhn 2000; Moshman
1998; 1999). In fact, if I may momentarily construe Stanovich &
West as research subjects, the arguments they provide in their target article (and similar analyses by authors they cite) constitute
clear evidence that human beings are capable of reasoning on the
basis of explicit understanding about the advantages and limitations of various heuristic strategies.
Putting all this together suggests that, beginning in the preschool years, all individuals routinely make a variety of automatic
inferences, both heuristic and rule-based. Over the course of development, to varying degrees, people increasingly engage in explicit reasoning. That is, they increasingly deploy and coordinate
heuristic and rule-based inferences on the basis of increasing
metacognitive knowledge about the nature, applicability, and justifiability of various forms of heuristic and rule-based inference
(Kuhn 2000; Moshman 1994; 1998; 1999). This picture has several important implications for our understanding of human rationality that are consistent with S&W’s emphasis on diversity but
go beyond their focus on individual differences.
First, without denying the importance of differences across individuals, it appears that a great deal of the diversity in human reasoning exists within individuals. From early childhood, people
routinely process information, automatically and unconsciously, in
accord with a variety of norms. Some of these norms are heuristic
guidelines and some are strict logical or mathematical rules. Perhaps some people are more disposed toward heuristic processing
and some toward rule-based processing but all people at all ages
regularly engage in both. With regard to the distinction between
heuristic and rule-based processing, the primary locus of diversity
is within individuals.
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Second, differences across individuals appear to be largely developmental. Over the course of childhood, adolescence, and early
adulthood, people increasingly – but to differing degrees – recognize that some inferences are better than others and that their
conclusions and actions will be more justifiable if they constrain
their inferences in accord with appropriate norms. Thus, they construct increasingly explicit knowledge about the nature and applicability of various heuristic and rule-based norms and, on the
basis of this knowledge, are increasingly deliberate in their reasoning. Although automatic inferences are ubiquitous across the
lifespan, there is a developmental trend toward increasingly explicit reasoning.
Finally, the present developmental picture suggests that rationality is fundamentally a matter of metacognition and only secondarily a matter of conformity to various logical or other norms. Individuals who deliberately choose to apply a particular rule,
principle, framework, or metaphor on the basis of an explicit understanding of the advantages and limitations of various normative and strategic options are functioning as rational agents, even
if they make mistakes in the course of their deliberations. Their
rationality can be evaluated, in fact, precisely because it possible
for them to make mistakes. As metacognitive agents, they can be
held responsible for their inferences.
In contrast, a computer that automatically processes information in accord with its program is not a rational agent at all, even
if its processing of information is fully in accord with logical or
other rules (Moshman 1994). Its rationality cannot be meaningfully evaluated. If it were to generate unjustifiable conclusions, responsibility for the faulty processing would lie with the programmer, not with the computer. The question of rationality arises only
with regard to agents who are sufficiently metacognitive to make
deliberate inferences and thus to be responsible for their processing of information.
In summary, Stanovich & West have provided a valuable picture
of individual differences in rationality. Extending this picture will,
I think, require greater attention to diversity within individuals,
the metacognitive nature of rationality, and the developmental basis for individual differences in metacognition.

Are there two different types of thinking?
Stephen E. Newstead
Department of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Plymouth PL4 8AA,
United Kingdom. s.newstead@plym.ac.uk

Abstract: Stanovich & West’s claim that there are two coherent and conceptually distinct types of thinking, System 1 and System 2, is questioned.
Some authors equate System 2 with intelligence whereas other do not; and
some authors regard the two types of system as distinct while others regard them as lying on a continuum.

There can be no question that Stanovich & West (S&W) have
made an important contribution to research on reasoning by emphasising the existence of individual differences and the implications they have for theories of reasoning. In this commentary I
wish to focus on just one issue: the claim that there is in the literature a wealth of evidence supporting the assertion that there exist two quite distinct types of thinking.
In their Table 3, S&W list a variety of authors who have postulated the existence of two systems. These include the distinctions
between heuristic and analytic processing, implicit and explicit
learning, and experiential and rational thinking. S&W make the
following claim: “Although the details and technical properties of
these dual-process theories do not always match exactly, nevertheless there are clear family resemblances.” In the ensuing discussion they treat the two types of thinking process, which they label System 1 and System 2, as though they are two quite distinct
and conceptually coherent systems. Although they are not the first
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authors to make this claim (see, for example, Epstein et al. 1996),
and although it is true that there are striking similarities between
the distinctions made by different theorists, I wish to claim that
there is little or no evidence that they amount to the same thing,
and considerable reason for believing that they do not.
In their target article, S&W present no argument or evidence
that the same distinction is being made by all these authors. Presumably, they thought that the similarities were so transparent not
to require such a defence. It is appropriate, then, to ask what kind
of evidence would support their claim. Perhaps the most persuasive line of evidence would be the existence of high correlations
between all these different measures. Unfortunately, few such
studies seem to have been done. Several studies have looked at
correlations between subcomponents of the two, but with inconclusive results. For example, Epstein et al. (1996) found that superstitious and categorical thinking, which might be supposed to
be part of System 1, produced no significant correlations, either
positive or negative, with Faith in Intuition (System 1) or Need for
Cognition (System 2). Stanovich & West (1997) themselves looked
at correlations between various measures of thinking which might
be related to either System 1 or System 2, but reported only “moderate intercorrelations” (their phrasing). In any case, there are
conceptual problems here since it is far from clear just how high
a correlation would be needed to provide evidence that two types
of thinking are part of the same System.
A more revealing line of evidence derives from systematic correlations between System 1 versus System 2 thinking and other
psychometric measures such as general intelligence (g). Many of
the researchers included in S&W’s Table 3 would actually equate
System 2 thinking with general intelligence. Evans (2000) states
quite explicitly: “Rationality 2 involves individual differences in
g . . . Hence intelligence – in the sense of g – depends upon the
effective use of the explicit thinking system.”
Others, however, set considerable store by the claim that their
version of System 2 thinking is not the same as intelligence.
Klaczynski and his colleagues have carried out a series of studies
investigating relationships between individual differences in rational processing and intelligence, and performance on a variety
of reasoning tasks. In the light of their finding that there are few
correlations between measures of rational processing and intelligence, Klaczynski et al. (1997) drew the conclusion that “decontextualized reasoning is a function of an array of personal dispositions distinct from intelligence” (p. 481). We have confirmed in
our own laboratory (Handley et al., 2000) the claim of Epstein and
his colleagues (e.g., Pacini & Epstein 1999) that their measure of
rational thought does not correlate with standard intelligence
scores. The fact that one supposed type of System 2 thinking is the
same as intelligence while another is completely distinct from it
surely leads to the conclusion that they are not really part of the
same system.
Other aspects of the different types of thinking presented in
Table 3 also lead to suspicions that they are really quite different
things. Some of the distinctions represent true dichotomies, in the
sense that they are mutually exclusive categories. System 1 thinking is unconscious (tacit, implicit) while System 2 thinking is conscious (explicit). This does not seem to permit any half-way house,
that is, thinking that is partly conscious. However, other types of
System 2 thinking would appear to lie on a continuum with System 1 thinking. There is a continuum between automatic and controlled processing; indeed, one of the most widely used examples
is that of driving a car, where a skill which is at first highly controlled gradually becomes more automatic. Similarly, the distinction between fast and slow processing is a difference of degree
rather than kind.
A related difference between the various types of thinking
lumped together in Table 3 involves the independence of the processes. As we have seen, some of the dimensions are clearly regarded as being related (for example, automatic and controlled
processing are usually considered opposite ends of a single dimension). However, Epstein and his colleagues (e.g., Pacini & Ep-
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